Terrorism and Organized Crime in India
D
Suba Chandran (Research Officer)
Organized
crime and terrorism result from ineffective governance and have developed a
symbiotic relationship; nevertheless, it is essential to differentiate them.
Neither are all terrorist acts organized crime, nor are all organized criminal
acts terrorism; in most developed countries, organized crime thrives with
little or no terrorist activities, and in most developing countries, terrorism
exists along with varying levels of organized criminal activity.
The
differences between them rest on means and ends. Terrorism aims to overthrow
the existing government by altering the status quo. Organized crime, on the
other hand aims to form a parallel government while coexisting with the
existing one; any change in the status quo is only circumstantial and born out
of convenience rather than zealous revisionist policy. Secondly, terrorism
primarily uses violent means, whereas organized crime prefers to be non-violent
notwithstanding odd resort to belligerence. Third, terrorism is driven purely
by political objectives despite exploitation of regional, national and
religious sentiments to achieve their ends; conversely, economic objectives are
the operational determinants of organized crime.
What
are the linkages between terrorism and organized crime and how are they
relevant in the Indian context? While organized crime involves many activities,
its linkages with terrorism stem from illegal trafficking of drugs, arms and
human beings and money laundering. Terrorist groups, whether indigenous or
sponsored by outside states, need arms and money for their fight against the
security forces. Organized crime conglomerates need a clientele and couriers
who can smuggle drugs, arms and human beings across the countries and regions.
In
India, the linkages between the two exist at national and transnational levels.
At the national level, both terrorists and those involved in organized crime
are within India. At the international level, collaboration exists between
transnational syndicates and terrorists from inside and outside India.
In
India’s northeast, almost all the militant groups run a parallel government or
have their areas of influence and are involved in collecting money directly
from the people. Much of the government funds reach the militants indirectly
due to misgovernance. Government officials in conflict zones are either
threatened or bribed to award contracts to individuals patronized by the
militant groups. Contracts apart, essential commodities like rice and kerosene
reach the militant groups directly which are then sold to the public at much
higher prices. This cycle, though unnoticed in other parts of India, is a clear
example of the linkage between organized crime and terrorism inside India.
Extortion,
kidnap, contracts and black marketing still fall short of financing the
nefarious activities of the militants. This is where transnational drugs and
arms syndicates come into play. Terrorist organizations in India, especially in
the northeast, mobilize funds by becoming couriers of illegal drugs and arms
and at times even human beings from one point to another within the country.
Some of the infamous entry points from Southeast Asia include Moreh and the
entire Chittagong Hill tracts, especially Cox’s Bazaar. Initially,
international criminal syndicates had their own network; however, with these
routes being taken over by various terrorist groups in the northeastern states,
the syndicates started using these groups instead of bribing them to let their
consignments get through.
In
Kashmir, the linkages between terrorists and organized crime exist at a
different level. Unlike the northeast, reliance on funds from extortion and
other related means is minimal. There is no parallel government in Kashmir and
government resources do not reach militant hands. However, external funds
compensate for inadequate internal mobilization. External funds reach the
militant organizations fighting in Kashmir thorough various means. For
instance, enormous funds that are mobilized in Pakistan and other Muslim
countries, especially in the Gulf, are channeled through various organizations
in Pakistan to Kashmir. Markaz dawa al Arshad, for example,
mobilizes funds from inside and outside Pakistan, to support its militant wing, Lashkar-e-Toiba.
Besides, external funds are also routed through select organizations and
individuals in Kashmir, which finally reach the militants. Money laundering
plays a significant role. Hawala (money laundering)
transactions take place swiftly and effectively in Kashmir. Besides, it is also
believed that the ISI uses drug money to fund militant activities in Kashmir.
Another
significant relationship between organized crime and terrorism, especially in
Kashmir, is through the spread of counterfeit currency. Terrorists are the main
couriers of Indian counterfeit currency inside Kashmir, which then spreads all
over India. Even guides for the militants from across the border are paid with
counterfeit money. In fact, when some of the ‘indigenous’ militants were also
paid with counterfeits, it resulted in squabble between them and the so-called
guest militants.
Besides
Kashmir and the northeast, sporadic incidents in other parts of India like the
Bombay blasts, for instance, have exposed the connection between terrorism and
organized crime. This is distinct from the traditional linkages flourishing
between organized crime syndicates and local criminals.
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